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Abstract This paper studies the effects of migration on the bilateral FDI of France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and the UK. By using five datasets covering different time spans going from 1990 to 2006, it 
analyses the effect on FDI of networks of immigrants from developed and developing countries and, for 
Italy and Spain, of emigrants’ networks as well. General results are that the FDI of the UK, Germany 
and France are affected by immigrants’ networks, while those of Italy and Spain are tied to their   
diasporas. Immigrants foster FDI only through their skilled component. This holds for both OECD and 
non-OECD immigrants, showing that networks may partially compensate for the negative effects of the 
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Perhaps you have taken children with you to your new home; others may have been born to you there. Our country, Italy, 
regards all these your children as its subjects. 
Bollettino dell’Emigrazione, 1910, No. 18. 
 
He was born in Thailand, lives in South Africa and carries a UK passport. But Jag Johal, chief executive of investment firm 
CBA Capital Partners, has undeniable ties to India. “I speak Hindi and Punjabi. My parents live in Delhi. I visit at least once 
a year,” said Mr Johal. “There are a lot of people like me.”  





Since the end of World War II, several Western European countries have attracted immigration 
flows. Initially people have arrived from ex-colonies and developing countries, but also from the 
poorest areas of Europe. Nowadays, the whole Western Europe attracts immigrants from the outside 
world.    
During the past, however, Western Europe has been a land of emigration. Since the mid nineteenth 
century, people in search of a new and better life departed from the UK, France, Germany, Greece, 
Portugal and other countries, and massively left from Italy, Ireland and Spain. While most of these 
migration outflows ended before World War II, the Italian one persisted until the beginning of the 
1970s, and those from Spain and Ireland until the 1980s. In modern history, no other area of the world 
has had such large and varied movements of populations, outwards and then inwards. The question then 
is, how does this affect the European economy, and more specifically, does it influence its economic 
interactions with the rest of the world?   
As formal barriers to international economic exchanges have gradually come down during the last 
few decades, informal impediments have become apparent. They are due to social, cultural and 
institutional differences between countries, and appear to have significant effects on transactions 
(Trefler, 1995; Obsfeld and Rogoff, 2000). Recent sociological and economic studies show that migrant 
communities typically tend to build links between their origin and destination countries. More precisely, 
migrants develop transnational networks, within which relevant economic information on economic 
opportunities concerning the home and residence economies flows (reviews are in Rauch, 2001; 
Wagner et al., 2002). Information flows more easily and efficiently than through the international price   3
system, especially when the transnational ties are built between very different or distant countries 
(Girma and Yu, 2002; Dunlevy, 2006). Immigrant communities, furthermore, tend to exert social 
control over the actions of their members, which reduces opportunism and the risks associated to 
international transactions. Hence, by lowering the informal barriers, migrant links may boost 
international flows of goods, services and capital.  
Empirical research has focused especially on the influence of networks on international trade (a 
partial list includes Head and Ries, 1998; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Blanes, 2006, Murat and Pistoresi, 
2009b), but other studies have analysed the impact of transnational ties on the foreign direct 
investments (FDI) of countries (Gao, 2003; Tong, 2005; Buch et al. 2006, Murat and Pistoresi, 2009a). 
Both lines of research have provided evidence in support of the basic hypothesis on migrant networks. 
According to the findings of this strand of literature, Western Europe should be significantly and 
positively affected by the transnational ties built by its immigrant and emigrant networks. This paper 
addresses this issue by focusing on networks and the bilateral FDI with the countries of origin and 
destination of, respectively, immigrants and emigrants. It focuses on five European countries, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. In particular, we focus on the separate influence of skilled and 
unskilled immigrants, the specific effects of skilled immigrants originating from developed and 
developing countries and, finally, the influence of emigrant networks. The latter are analysed only in 
relation to two out of the five countries, Italy and Spain.   
The skill-based distinction arises from the observation that investments abroad are more complex, 
costly and risky than pure trade and, therefore, are more likely to be undertaken by individuals with 
higher education levels and skills. A frequent hypothesis of recent studies (Kugler and Rapoport, 2007; 
Javorcik et al., 2006 and Docquier and Lodigiani, 2009) is that skilled immigrants may have a higher 
impact on the bilateral FDI.  
Two well-known regularities of the world economy are that global FDI tend to cluster within the 
group of developed economies and migration flows are mainly directed towards these countries. We 
split the networks of skilled immigrants in relation to the level of development of their countries of   4
origin, distinguishing in particular between OECD and non-OECD economies. This allows us to check 
for the specific influence of non-OECD skilled immigrants, and to asses whether they contribute, 
through network effects, to narrowing the existing FDI gap between rich and developing countries. A 
narrowing of the FDI gap would also partially compensate for the brain drain that the skilled migration 
implied in the first place (Docquier and Rapoport, 2007; Arora and Gambardella, 2005; Commander et 
al. 2004; Saxenian, 2001). 
Data on emigration are available only for Italy and Spain, two economies that experienced massive 
emigration flows during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
1. A common feature of these two nations 
is that they have maintained tight links with their external diasporas and, as a consequence, that they 
keep detailed official records on emigrants. This availability of data has made this paper’s analysis on 
emigrants feasible. We check for the separate effects of emigrants residing in developed and developing 
countries but, because of a lack of reliable data on the educational attainment of emigrants, we cannot 
measure the separate influence of individuals with different levels of skills. 
In contrast with other papers, which use a single database to measure the exchanges between several 
receiving and sending countries (Docquier and Lodigiani, 2009; Tong, 2005; Rauch and Trindade, 
2002), our study utilizes five different sets of data, one for each of our countries of interest. This allows 
us to draw our figures from a wider overall pool of information. We use the same regression equations, 
techniques and tests for each country, hence, although the cross-country results are not strictly 
comparable, they can still be discussed in a unified setting. 
Our main findings are that while the FDI of the UK, France and Germany are affected by the 
immigrant links, those of Spain and especially Italy depend on the ties with  their respective diasporas. 
Also, the splitting of immigrant populations into skilled and unskilled immigrants reveals a common 
pattern: skilled immigrants generally have a positive, and in most cases significant, influence on 
bilateral FDI, while unskilled immigrants have non-significant and in some cases negative effects. This 
is consistent with previous studies. The further division of skilled immigrants into OECD and non-
                                                 
1 Another interesting country from this point of view is Ireland. However, there are no records on the Irish diaspora 
comparable to those on the  Italian and Spanish ones.   5
OECD networks shows that both have positive effects, with a relative importance that depends on the 
country under analysis. This implies that skilled networks from developing economies can positively 
affect the bilateral FDI with their countries of origin.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the main issues and the descriptive statistics. 
Section III contains the empirical model. Section IV illustrates the data. Section V presents the main 
results of the regressions while Section VI concludes. The Appendix contains the detailed regressions 
on each country and the list of partner economies considered in each dataset. 
 
II. Migrant networks, diasporas and investments abroad 
Immigration in France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain has increased substantially 
during the last two decades, but for some of these countries it was an important phenomenon even 
before then. Since the end of the Second World War, immigrants have arrived in the UK from various 
areas of the world and especially from its ex-colonies and the Commonwealth, in France principally 
from Southern Europe and its ex-colonies, and in Germany mainly from some European countries and 
the Middle East. Immigration in Italy and Spain is more recent, but it has grown so rapidly that the 
presence of immigrants within the overall population is now quite significant
2.  
Italy and Spain also differ from the first three countries in that they were countries of massive 
emigration. Migration from Italy took place mainly during the hundred years from 1870 to 1970, while 
from Spain it lasted until the ’80s of the last century. Both nations have built and continue to maintain 
close links with their diasporas. Italian and Spanish emigrants and their descents living permanently 
abroad can retain citizenship of their home countries. They hold the right to vote in the home countries’ 
parliamentary elections and, from 2006, Italian emigrants also have their own parliamentary 
representatives. Both countries keep detailed records of their diasporas, which include the years of 
registration of emigrants and their progeny and their foreign countries of residence. The data on 
emigrants utilised in this paper are extracted from these records.  
                                                 
2 The Eurostat estimated figure for resident foreigners relative to the total population during 2005 is about 5% in Spain, Italy 
and the UK, and above 7% in France and Germany.   6
Similarly, the FDI in and out of the five economies have substantially increased with the 
globalization of the world markets, but the UK, France and, to a lesser degree, Germany, have longer 
and well-established histories of investing abroad and receiving foreign investments. Table 1 contains 
some descriptive statistics based on the five datasets. They show that these three countries’ FDI are 
larger than those of Spain and Italy. However, if considered in per-capita terms (figures not in the 
Table), only those of Italy remain significantly below those of the other economies.  
Table 1 also shows that, as expected, there is a strong clustering of the five countries’ FDI, both 
inward and outward, within the group of OECD economies. The shares of the outward FDI directed to 
non-OECD countries out of the total FDI are, at the two extremes, 6.7% for Italy and 32.3% for Spain. 
Similarly, the shares of the total FDI originating from non-OECD economies are 1.44% for Italy and 
9.38% for Spain. The figures for the other countries lie in between. The distribution of immigrants in 
terms of countries of origin has the opposite shape: the shares of immigrants originating from non-
OECD countries tend to be higher. In this respect, Italy is at the upper end, with 82% of immigrants 
being non-OECD, while Germany is at the lower end, with only 30% of immigrants originating from 
non-OECD countries.  
The distribution of immigrants in terms of skills also reveals some interesting patterns: in this case, 
the highest shares of immigrant population and also the highest absolute values of skilled immigrants 
are found in the UK (33% and 999,224 respectively), while the lowest are those of Italy (13.8% and 
122,570 respectively). Furthermore, the share of non-OECD skilled immigrants is also higher in the UK 
than in the other countries while it is lowest in Italy, despite the fact that this country has the highest 
share of non-OECD immigrants.  
Turning now to emigration, Table 1 shows that Italian emigrants reside in OECD countries more 
than Spanish ones (78.5% and 46.2% respectively). Our raw data also show that, outside the OECD, 
Italian emigrants are present mainly in Latin American countries, Australia and South Africa, while 
emigrants from Spain are more concentrated in Latin American countries. The data also show that the 
two variables, immigration and emigration, are reciprocally independent. They are non-correlated   7
through both time and space in the two databases. While the values for emigrant stocks are high from 
the initial years and grow slowly through time, those of immigrants are initially low and grow very 
rapidly. Also, emigrant communities are present mostly in developed and Latin American countries, 
while immigrants originate mostly from north African, African, East European, Asian countries and, 
also, Latin America. The correlation values between emigration and immigration in the two databases 
are -0.072 in Italy and 0.081 in Spain.  
 
III. The empirical specification 
We start from a version of the gravity model based on Markusen and Maskus (2002) and Gao (2003). 
We therefore include the sum of the GDP of the countries involved in the FDI (tgdp) as an indicator of 
the size of the economies, and the squared difference of GDPs (sq_gdpdiff), as a measure of similarity; 
following Gao (2003), we also add in the difference in per capita GDP (pcgdpdiff)
3, as a proxy of 
differences in relative factor endowments or factors’ productivity. The choice of these variables is based 
on a literature on gravity and FDI that distinguishes between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ models of 
foreign investments. In it, firms invest ‘horizontally’ because of market proximity motivations, i.e. to 
sell abroad the same goods sold at home, while they make ‘vertical’ investments to exploit relative 
factor endowment differences. Most horizontal FDI are supposed to take place between similar 
countries while the opposite applies to vertical FDI (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). This 
augmented version of the gravity model is particularly suited for our analysis, which includes developed 
and developing countries. 
Following the basic hypothesis of the gravity model, we expect tgdp to show a positive coefficient, 
as the level of the transactions between two countries is supposed to be higher the bigger the economic 
dimension of the two. The horizontal model is consistent with a positive coefficient of tgdp, a negative 
coefficient of sq_gdpdiff and a negative coefficient of pcgdpdiff. The vertical model of FDI predicts 
positive coefficients of the two variables in differences, the sq_gdpdiff and the pcgdpdiff.  
                                                 
3 This variable is the positive difference (zero otherwise) between the sending and receiving countries of investments.   8
The gravity model is then augmented with a range of other factors which can in principle influence 
FDI, including the economic characteristics of the origin and host markets, their cultural and 
institutional features and, in particular, our main variables of interest: the international networks of 
migrants. Thus, the specification of our model is:  
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where FDI, distance, openness and variables related to gdp and network are expressed in logarithms
4; i 
and t are subscripts for the partner country and year, Dt are time dummies. 
FDIit is the stock of foreign direct investment from the country of origin to the country of destination 
(for outward FDI, the country of origin is one of the 5 economies under investigation, and the host 
country is the partner i, while for inward FDI the link goes the opposite way). dist is the great circle 
distance between capital cities of the countries of origin and destination of the FDI, which is meant to 
capture all the measurable and invisible transaction costs related to travel and communication, but may 
also capture profitable differences in endowments. Its coefficient, therefore, is not signed a priori. 
openness is the share of exports plus imports in each country’s GDP, which is a measure of the 
commercial openness of countries. In principle, bilateral FDI and trade can be complements or 
substitutes; hence, again, no assumptions are made on the sign of this variable. 
The set of indicators we use to control for cultural and institutional similarities between countries 
includes a standardized composite index (governance) to indicate the quality of foreign countries’ 
institutions; the share of Christian religion in each partner country as a proxy for religion and culture 
(religion);  in the regressions for France and the UK, two dummies capturing the presence of past 
colonial ties (Dcolotie) and of a common language (Dlang) with the foreign economies; and dummies 
                                                 
4 Since taking the logarithm would lead to negative values for observations for which the total stock of FDI acquires a value 
lower than unity and the lack of observations when total stocks are equal to zero, we add one before taking the log.   9
indicating the partner countries’ membership to economic and political regional areas, the European 
Union of 15 members (Deu15) and the OECD (Doecd). These dummies are supposed to capture trade 
and political agreements, but also similarities among member countries not picked up by the 
institutional and cultural variables listed above. On the assumption that similarity boosts investments 
abroad, the expected signs of the cultural, institutional and regional variables are positive.  
The model is then further augmented to include our variables of interest (network). In the simplest 
specification, we add in the immigrant stock from each partner country, i.e. the number of immigrants 
(immigrants). A subsequent specification will also include, for Italy and Spain, the stocks of Italian and 
Spanish emigrants residing in each foreign country (emigrants). Following the theory of networks, 
emigrants, as well as immigrants, are expected to have positive and significant effects on bilateral FDI.  
Because of the complexity of investment operations abroad, networks of skilled immigrants are 
expected to have a higher impact than those of low-skilled immigrants, for both outward and inward 
FDI. Hence, the stocks of immigrants are split into the skilled_immi  and  lowskilled_immi  subsets. 
Because data on emigrants’ education levels are not available, the same operation is not performed for 
the emigrant stocks. 
As seen previously, the biggest share of world FDI remains within the group of developed 
economies. We split the stocks of skilled immigrants into OECD and non-OECD networks (the same 
operation could be performed for the unskilled, but, as will become clear in the next paragraph, it would 
not lead to significant insights). The splitting will help to reveal whether the movements of people 
between developed and developing countries, through skilled networks, tend to narrow the FDI gap 
between the two regions.  
When both the immigrant and the emigrant variables are included among the regressors, we do not 
have prior expectations about the relative importance of the two. The results may depend on the type of 
migration and on the characteristics of the transnational links. A factor that might obviously affect the 
strength of migrants’ ties is time, but these effects may vary non linearly. On the one hand, immigrants 
may need time to settle in the host country and develop economic ties with home, on the other hand,   10
after decades and even generations since the arrival, and since the building of the initial transnational 
link, they may loose interest into preserving or reinvigorating them (Blanes, 2006; Murat, Pistoresi and 
Rinaldi, 2009, Gould, 1994). Without a general hypothesis on the effect of time on networks, we 
assume that both the ‘old’ emigration networks and the ‘recent’ immigration ones have positive effects 
on the bilateral FDI. 
The time dummies Dt are meant to capture a variety of macroeconomic and FDI policy factors that 
affect the foreign investments of our countries of interest and of the partner economies. Possible omitted 
variables that vary through time but affect our five European countries and their foreign partners are 
subsumed in these dummies.  
One potential issue in this empirical analysis is endogeneity, which may arise from the presence of 
omitted variables (Bhattacharya and Groznik, 2008), measurement error, or simultaneity. We therefore 
resort to the Instrumental Variable (IV) approach to control for this issue for the immigrants variable. 
Finding a good instrument in this context can be difficult, in particular due to lack of data. Following 
Javorcik et al. (2006), we use the stock of immigrants living in the EU-15 in 1990
5, i.e. before the 
period covered in our analysis, disaggregated by country of origin and level of educational attainment,. 
The IV variable should be correlated with the size of the immigrant population, via the set of possible 
factors inducing migration, but, as the authors state, it is not expected to explain the FDI. It can 
therefore be considered exogenous. Depending on the type of migration variable to be instrumented, we 
use the corresponding instrument (total migration, skilled and unskilled migration)
6.  
The first stage is therefore: 
 
t i it controls EU immig network ε δ α α + × + × + = 15 _ 90 1 0  
 
                                                 
5 For Spain, we use the data for 2000, as the period covered in the analysis is subsequent to this year. 
6 We do not utilize the other two instruments used in Javorcik et al. (2006), i.e. the cost of obtaining a national passport in 
the country of origin of migrants, because the data are available only for a smaller set of countries, and population density, 
which in our sample is never significant and therefore not a relevant instrument.   11
where  network is the (logarithm of the) network variable instrumented, immig90_EU15 is the 
corresponding instrumental variable concerning previous migration to the EU-15, and controls is the set 
of exogenous variables of the main regression.  
We run both OLS and IV regressions, testing for endogeneity through the Hausman test and the test 
for no correlation between the error terms in first and second stage regressions. When there is no 
evidence of an endogeneity issue, both the IV and the OLS estimates are consistent, and we show the 
latter since it is by definition more efficient. When endogeneity is detected, the IV estimates are 




IV. The Data  
The partner countries and time periods considered in each dataset, regarding France, Germany, Italy, 
the United Kingdom and Spain, vary according to data availability. The partner economies of each of 
our five countries and the time span covered are listed in the Appendix. 
The main sources of immigration figures are national censuses and the OECD Database on 
immigrants and expatriates, Total population by nationality and country of birth (detailed countries and 
Population 15+ by nationality, country of birth (detailed countries) and educational attainment. The 
latter data are available for a single year, corresponding to the last census, 1999 for France, 2001 for 
Italy and the UK. For Germany, figures are from the Microcensus, and cover the years 1999-2002. Data 
on immigration in Spain are from the Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigraciòn. The data on the stocks of 
Italian emigrants are from the AIRE (Registry Office of Italians Residing Abroad), while those on 
Spanish emigrants are from the CERA (Censo Electoral Residentes Ausentes).  
Figures on bilateral FDI are taken from Source OECD International Direct Investment Statistics - 
International direct investment by country Vol. 2005 release 01 for France, and from  UNCTAD WID 
                                                 
7 We never show the J-test for over-identifying restrictions, used to (partially) control for instrument exogeneity, because in 
the cases when the TSLS approach is required, only one of the instruments (the stock of immigrants in the EU) is significant; 
therefore the endogenous variable is not overidentified, and the test cannot be carried out.   12
Country Profiles and National Statistics for the other countries (for Germany, these rely on 
“International Capital Links”, Special Statistical Publication 10, Deutsche Bundesbank, April 2005; for 
the UK, on Foreign Direct Investment - Business Monitor MA4, Office for National Statistics). The data 
on the bilateral FDI of Spain are from the Ministerio de Turismo, Industria y Comercio. Data on GDP, 
in current prices, and per capita GDP are taken from the IMF – World Economic Outlook Database. The 
distance measure is taken from the USDA-ARS United States Department of Agriculture – Agricultural 
Research Service website. 
Data on the share of the Christian religion in each country and the governance indicators are taken 
from the CIA World Factbook and from World Bank Institute, Governance & Anti-Corruption - 
Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2005, respectively. Data on openness are from the A. Heston, 
R. Summers and B. Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of 
Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006. Figures used for the 
instruments in TSLS are from the dataset of Docquier and Marfouk (2006) as far as the stock of immigrants in 
the EU is concerned, and from the World Bank – World Development Indicators for the population density. 
 
V. Key findings  
The final regression models for both inward and outward FDI for the five countries are presented in 
Table 2. A wider set of regressions has been run for each country following the incremental approach 
explained above, and are included in the Appendix
8. 
As far as the outward FDI are concerned,  Table 2 shows no clear common pattern across the five 
countries as for the prevalence of either the horizontal or the vertical model of investments abroad. The 
coefficients of tgdp are positive when significant, but the signs and significance of the coefficients of 
sq_gdpdiff and pcgdpdiff tend to differ, even within each country, so altogether no robust evidence in 
                                                 
8 In Table 2, all the estimates are from OLS regressions because tests show that no endogeneity issue arises. In Tables A1-5, 
IV estimates are depicted in relation to four cases: the outward FDI for France, Germany and Italy, and the inward FD for the 
UK. The network variable included is immigrants. We do not report the first stage of these regressions, but in all cases, the 
instrument, which is the size of the immigrant population in the EU-15 in 1990 by country of origin, shows coefficients that 
are positive (ranging from 0.40 to 0.75) and significant at the 1% level, as confirmed by the first stage F-statistic shown in 
the Tables..   13
favour of a particular model of investment is provided. The variable dist, which is a proxy for both 
tangible and invisible costs of geographical distance between countries, has significant coefficients in 
the regressions regarding three economies, Italy, Spain and the UK, but with opposite signs. They show 
that Italian and Spanish firms tend to prefer nearby markets for their investments abroad, while British 
multinationals are eager to invest in faraway economies. For Italy and Spain, a 10% increase in distance 
is associated with a 5.4% decrease in investments abroad, for the UK a 10% increase in distance implies 
an increase by almost 7% in FDI
9. The coefficients of the variable openness  are non-significant, 
showing the absence of a clear pattern of substitution or complementarity between the openness to trade 
of the partner economies and the amount of foreign investments they receive. Similarly, membership of 
the recipient country to the EU15 and OECD (intended to capture the effects of the OECD countries 
that do not belong to the EU15) does not appear to encourage investments there from the five countries.  
As for the cultural and institutional variables, we note that the level of French outward FDI is much 
higher in those countries that share a common language (in Model 1: the coefficient for French being 
spoken in the partner country is 2.34, colonial ties positively affect Spanish investments abroad (in 
Model 4, the coefficient on Dcolotie is 3.44), while British FDI seem to be lower in Commonwealth 
economies than in non-Commonwealth ones (Model 5), which is consistent with the findings of Girma 
and Yu (2002) regarding trade.
10 The share of Christians in the population of the partner economy, 
which again is supposed to capture a cultural similarity between countries,  appears to be somehow 
relevant only for Italian firms investing abroad (in Model 3, an increase by 10 percentage points of the 
Christian population in the foreign country increases Italian FDI there by above 14%)
11. As expected, 
the quality of institutions in the partner economy is a positive factor in attracting FDI from three of the 
                                                 
9 Here and in the rest of the paper we will compute the exact percentage variation in predicted FDI as  1 ) ˆ exp( − β . 
10 Our raw data show that French is the official or administrative language in three out of the first ten countries in order of 
importance for France’s outward FDI (which are, respectively: USA, Belgium, UK, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, 
Spain, Italy, Luxembourg and Brazil). Two of the first ten countries for Spain’s outward FDI are ex colonies (the list is: 
Netherlands, UK, Luxembourg, Portugal, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Ireland, France and Switzerland).  
 
11 However, this result is not robust across different specifications, as shown in Table A3.   14
five countries under analysis; the coefficient of the variable governance is highly significant for France, 
Germany and Spain, with values ranging from 2.9 to 6.2. 
Our main variable of interest, the networks of immigrants, confirms our prior expectations and 
reveals some interesting features. The overall picture supports our basic hypothesis: skilled immigrants 
seem to positively affect direct investments from their hosting economies to their countries of origin, 
which is consistent with the findings of Kugler and Rapoport (2007), Javorcik et al. (2006) and 
Docquier and Lodigiani (2009). This is particularly true for the UK, with skilled immigrants from both 
OECD and non-OECD countries having a major positive impact on the level of British outward FDI. A 
significant effect is found for German FDI as well, but only for individuals coming from non-OECD 
countries. This seems to suggest that skilled immigrants living in these economies help to bridge the 
existing FDI “divide” with their countries of origin. Also, through this channel, they partly compensate 
for the brain drain generated by emigration. A weaker evidence for the effect of skilled foreign-born 
individuals is found also for Spain, this time involving only the network of migrants from OECD 
countries.  
No consistent pattern emerges for unskilled immigrants. The only robust result concerns the UK (see 
also Table A5), in which case we find a negative (although only weakly significant) coefficient. 
Negative values, indicating a possible ‘substitution’ effect between low-skilled immigration and 
investments abroad, have also been found by Kugler and Rapoport (2007) for the U.S. A positive 
relationship is found for Italy, but this result is not robust to different model specifications (see Table 
A3). 
We now turn to the inward FDI equations (Models 6 to 10 of Table 2). Again, no consistent pattern 
in favour of either a horizontal or a vertical model of investment emerges. Each country seems to be 
characterized differently. Distance appears to have a negative impact on inward FDI, and this effect is 
significant for Italy, Spain and the UK, while it is not for France and Germany (as happened for the 
outward FDI).. Again, the variable openness is in general not significant, with the exception of the 
British inward FDI, where it is negative but has only a 10% significance level. The dummy OECD is   15
never significant, while the EU15 dummy is positive and significant at the 10% for Germany. . The 
common language is a positive factor affecting the investments from abroad in both Spain and the UK, 
while it is not significant for France. The presence of colonial ties does not appear to be important. 
As for outward FDI, a similarity as far as religion is concerned  appears to positively affect inward 
FDI only for Italy, but again the variable only has a 10% significance level (Model 8). For the other four 
countries, on the other hand, the coefficients of governance are positive and significant, implying that 
countries where the quality of the institutions is higher tend to have firms that invest more abroad.   
Once more, we find evidence in favour of our hypothesis concerning the role of migrant networks, 
and it appears to be more generalized than for the analysis on outward FDI. Here, all countries but Italy 
seem to benefit from the presence of skilled immigrants in terms of investments from abroad. For 
France, Germany and Spain, the coefficients for individuals born in OECD countries is higher than for 
non-OECD countries, which is expected as OECD members tend to be richer than non members and 
therefore can invest more. In any case, both groups of highly-educated immigrants seem to convey 
economic opportunities: a 1% increase in the number of skilled foreign-born individuals from OECD 
and non-OECD countries generates an increase by 4.77% and 2.59% respectively in French inward 
FDI; for Germany, the percentages are 2.47 and 1.17; for Spain, both are around 4%. For the UK, only 
migrants coming from non-OECD countries seem to have an effect, which can be easily explained by 
the presence of many Commonwealth nations in this group. This impact appears to be much bigger than 
that for the other countries though: with a 1% increase in the stock of foreign-born, inward FDI soar by 
12.50%.  
No clear pattern emerges as far as unskilled migrants are concerned. The coefficients of the related 
variable (lowskilled_immi) are generally negative, but they are either not significant or only weakly 
so
12. The only exception is Spain, which shows a negative coefficient with a 5% significance level.  
We now consider a different source of network effects on FDI, those of emigrants. The results for 
Italy and Spain are shown in Table 3, which reveals that the variable’s coefficients are positive and 
                                                 
12 In any case, the results do not appear to be robust to different specifications of the model, as shown in the Appendix.   16
significant for both countries, in the outward and inward regressions. These findings not only confirm 
our expectations, but are also stronger than those concerning the networks of highly-educated 
immigrants. The above positive coefficients on skilled immigrants regarding Spain lose their 
significance when emigrants are included in the regressions. 
The inclusion of the emigrants variable in the regressions concerning Italy does not change the 
coefficients of the other variables. Those related to the networks of immigrants were non-significant and 
no difference arises when including the networks of emigrants. However, the coefficient of the cultural 
proxy religion loses its significance. It should be remembered that in Table 2, Italy was the only country 
where the share of Christians in the population of the partner countries positively affected both the 
inward and outward FDI. The cultural factors previously included in ‘religion’ now appear to be 
captured more directly by the emigrants variable. 
More precisely, a 10% increase in the presence of emigrants in partner countries increases the Italian 
outward FDI by 3.40%, and the inward FDI by 4.45%. These results show that, in fact, the information 
and enforcement services provided by migrants do matter for Italian firms investing abroad and for 
firms investing in Italy, but only when they are provided by Italian networks. The splitting of the stocks 
into emigrants_OECD and emigrants_nonOECD leads to positive and significant coefficients in both 
cases, for both outward and inward FDI (Models 2 and 4 of Table 3). The influence of the non-OECD 
networks appears to be slightly higher than that of the OECD emigrants in the outward FDI regression 
(Model 2). 
 The effect of the diaspora on Spain’s bilateral FDI appears to be even stronger than in the Italian 
case. In Models 5 to 8 of Table 3, a 10% increase in the stock of Spanish emigrants abroad leads to an 
increase by 11% in the country’s inward FDI. In the outward equations, a 10% increase in emigrants 
towards OECD countries leads to an increase by 8.26% in FDI and in non-OECD networks to an 
increase of 13% (Models 5 and 6). Therefore, emigrants residing both in developed and in developing 
countries strongly influence the country’s FDI. This, together with the diminished immigrant effects in   17
Table 3, seems to suggest that, similarly to the case of Italy, the information and enforcement services 
provided by the national diaspora are preferred to those provided by the immigrant communities. 
It might be inferred from this that the same results could apply to the other three countries, France, 
Germany and the UK, were the data on nationals abroad also available for them. This would hold only 
if the phenomenon of emigration from these countries is similar to the Italian and Spanish ones in terms 
of characteristics and intensity of the links. It must be considered, however, that a likely reason why 
these other three European countries do not have registries of their citizens abroad, comparable to those 
of Italy and Spain, may be simply that they do not have such strong diasporas.
13 
Moreover, while these results on Italian and Spanish emigrants can be taken just as further evidence 
confirming the predictions of networks theory, the countries’ strong preferences for emigrant links can 
also bear another interpretation, which is that the two economies are missing relevant opportunities of 
accessing the emerging markets from which many immigrants originate. It also shows that non-OECD 
immigrants living in Italy and Spain are not significantly contributing to narrowing the FDI ‘divide’ 
with their countries of origin
14.   
 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the effects of immigrant networks on the bilateral FDI of five European 
countries and, for two of them, those of the emigrant diasporas. Its main findings are that the countries 
analyzed seem to follow two different models: in one, involving the UK, France and Germany, skilled 
immigrants have a positive and significant influence on the bilateral FDI involving their countries of 
origin; in the other, applicable to Italy and Spain, bilateral FDI are strongly influenced by the countries’ 
emigrant population.  
                                                 
13 The emigration phenomenon has not been homogenous for the three countries considered. Emigration from the UK during 
the last centuries has mostly merged with the host country populations. At the other extreme, the existence of old German 
communities abroad is still quite perceptible, but their links with the homeland are weaker than those of Italians and 
Spaniards. The same applies to French emigration, with the difference with respect to the first two countries that it was never 
a mass movement (Sowell, 1996). 
14 This seems to follow especially from the regressions on Italy: even in Table 2, where the influence of emigrants is absent, 
immigrants do not affect the FDI. In the case of Spain, the weakness of immigrant effects (from Table 2 to Table 3) may be 
due to the partial geographical overlapping of emigrants and immigrants in some Latin American countries.   18
In the regressions concerning the UK, France and Germany, the aggregate stock of immigrants is 
generally non-significant. The splitting of the variable into skilled and unskilled individuals reveals the 
stronger positive effect of the former, and the negative or non-significant effect of the latter. In the 
regression on the FDI of Italy and Spain, the aggregate stocks of emigrants have positive effects 
regardless of skill levels. Hence, while the findings concerning the first three countries respond to our 
expectations and confirm the previous results in the literature, those concerning the second two were not 
entirely expected. Our ex-ante conjectures were that both types of networks, of immigrants and 
emigrants, would influence the countries’ FDI. This was more so because the geographic distributions 
of immigrants and emigrants mostly do not overlap; economic operators were expected to find it 
convenient to refer to immigrants for some sets of foreign countries and to emigrants for others. The 
finding that only the latter networks are active could reveal a tendency of diversion rather of creation of 
overall FDI. 
Migrant networks affect the FDI of the five countries independently of the world areas they are tied 
to. The coefficients of both OECD and non-OECD skilled immigrants or emigrants tend to be 
significant and statistically similar. This implies that migrant networks help to bridge the FDI gap 
between developed and developing countries and, in the case of skilled migration, to partly compensate 
for the negative effect of the brain drain for the immigrants’ countries of origin. This latter effect 
appears to be stronger in the UK and less important in Germany and France.  
Why the network links prevailing in each group of countries differ is an issue that can be addressed 
by future research. This paper has shown that there are different degrees and combinations of network 
activity across the five countries, with the UK and Italy standing at two opposite extremes, one of strong 
links created by skilled immigrants, the other of pure diaspora effects. Possible causes may include the 
production structure of the economies and the characteristics of the immigrant population. The average 
size of firms and multinationals, large in the UK and small in Italy, and the immigrants’ role in the 
country, skilled individuals or raw labour force, may also count. 
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 Table 1 - Summary statistics of some variables of interest 
1 
  Inward FDI (mln USD)  Outward FDI (mln USD)  Emigrants 
France                   
Total                240,519   100%                326,346   100%       
OECD                236,496   98.33%                297,167   91.06%       
Non OECD                    4,023   1.67%                  29,179   8.94%       
                    
Germany                   
Total                274,789   100%                619,990   100%       
OECD                270,120   98.30%                575,956   92.90%       
Non OECD                    4,669   1.70%                  44,034   7.10%       
                    
Italy                   
Total                105,038   100%                148,270   100%              2.346.249   100%
OECD                103,524   98.56%                138,297   93.27%              1.840.604   78.45%
Non OECD                    1,514   1.44%                    9,973   6.73%                 505.645   21.55%
                    
Spain                   
Total                244,235   100%                194,405   100%              1.050.527   100%
OECD                221,327   90.62%                131,047   67.41%                 485.295   46.20%
Non OECD                  22,908   9.38%                  63,358   32.59%                 565.232   53.80%
                    
United Kingdom                   
Total                483,457   100%                811,599   100%       
OECD                474,259   98.10%                751,032   92.54%       
Non OECD                    9,198   1.90%                  60,567   7.46%       
  Immigrants Skilled  immigrants  Share of skilled 
migration
2 
France                   
Total           4,174,651   100% 694,372  17.39% 
OECD           2,044,143   48.97% 275,727  14.06% 
Non OECD           2,130,508   51.03% 418,645  20.61% 
                    
Germany                   
Total           6,386,690   100% 764,206  14.25% 
OECD           4,474,056   70.05% 482,174  12.91% 
Non OECD           1,912,634   29.95% 282,032  17.33% 
                    
Italy                   
Total           1,100,821   100% 122,570  13.79% 
OECD              199,295   18.10% 53,719  29.20% 
Non OECD              901,526   81.90% 68,851  9.77% 
                    
Spain                   
Total           1,573,556   100% 268,890  19.71% 
OECD              396,400   25.19% 99,923  27.99% 
Non OECD           1,177,156   74.81% 168,967  16.77% 
                    
United Kingdom                   
Total           3,260,944   100% 999,224  33.02% 
OECD           1,841,522   56.47% 547,084  32.39% 
Non OECD           1,419,422   43.53% 452,140  33.82% 
1 Data from the five datasets. The size of each sample varies according to data availability.         
Year of reference: latest census for France (1999), Germany and UK (2001); 2002 for Italy, 2003 for Spain. 
2 Share of skilled migration = Skilled immigrants / Immigrants aged 15 and over.   
Table 2 - Migrant networks and FDI 
Dependent variable:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Country France  Germany  Italy  Spain  UK  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  UK 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
l_TGDP 3.747  **  3.270 *** -1.120   2.776 *** 0.303     2.337 **  2.256 *** -1.393   3.107 *** 2.172  *** 
   (1.522)   (0.558)   (2.548) (0.847)  (0.947)     (1.089) (0.745) (3.045)   (0.800)   (0.597)    
l_sq_GDPDIFF  -0.152     -0.587 *** 0.982    -0.413 *  -0.077    -0.266    -0.544 **  1.115    -0.338 **  -0.253  *** 
   (0.144)     (0.164)   (1.175)    (0.212)    (0.089)    (0.256)   (0.220)   (1.383)    (0.166)    (0.063)    
l_PCGDPDIFF 0.125    0.035 -0.052   0.243 **  -0.149 **  0.262 **  0.230 *** 0.360 *** 0.048   0.102  * 
   (0.112)    (0.046) (0.060)   (0.121)   (0.068)    (0.105) (0.061) (0.119)   (0.150)   (0.054)    
l_DIST  0.118     0.133    -0.783 *** -0.771 *  0.516 *  -0.040    -0.245    -0.791 *** -1.368 **  -1.034  *** 
   (0.378)     (0.153)    (0.221)    (0.448)    (0.292)    (0.447)    (0.238)    (0.328)    (0.528)    (0.332)    
l_OPENNESS  0.777    0.521  -0.120    0.312     0.511  -0.143  -0.941       -1.058  * 
   (0.542)    (0.367)   (0.520)     (0.523)    (0.478)   (0.410)   (0.650)       (0.572)    
DUMMYEU15  0.571     0.384    0.342    0.963    0.604    0.964    1.073 *  1.066    0.351    0.175    
   (1.090)     (0.432)    (0.446)    (0.714)    (0.828)    (0.763)    (0.581)    (0.663)    (1.016)    (0.494)    
DUMMYOECD -0.638    1.770   3.069   -1.394   -0.718     -3.881   -4.457   0.801   -0.539   16.250   
   (4.677)    (1.934) (2.695)   (2.373)   (4.742)    (3.288) (2.676) (2.963)   (2.924)   (9.866)    
DUMMYLANG  2.338  **                      0.811              2.638 **  1.338  * 
   (1.167)                         (1.028)              (1.270)    (0.788)    
DUMMYCOLOTIE
1 -1.947        3.439 *** -1.552 *  -0.712           0.837     
   (1.269)        (0.842)   (0.838)    (1.116)           (0.512)    
RELIGION  0.982     0.359    0.886 *  0.629    0.675    0.009    -0.618    1.190 *  0.846    -1.317    
   (0.809)     (0.383)   (0.453)    (0.904)    (0.744)    (0.763)   (0.617)   (0.598)    (1.260)    (0.939)    
GOVERNANCE_Std 4.537  **  2.868 *** 1.792   6.161 *** 1.617     3.010 **  3.787 **  0.557   4.655 **  7.411  *** 
   (2.085)    (0.802)   (1.300)   (1.823)   (1.571)    (1.476)   (1.658)   (2.240)   (1.842)   (1.957)    
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI  0.080     0.002    0.265    -0.685    -0.769 *  -0.615   -0.484 *  -0.164    -1.391 **  -0.630   
   (0.450)     (0.162)    (0.181)    (0.553)    (0.398)    (0.375)    (0.276)    (0.247)    (0.615)    (0.381)    
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD  0.621    0.368   -0.365   1.282 *  1.703 ** 1.754 *** 1.243 *** -0.098  1.628 ** 0.780     
   (0.879)    (0.265)   (0.361)   (0.692)   (0.721)    (0.644)   (0.354)   (0.419)   (0.801)   (0.549)    
l_SKILLED_IMMI  0.646     0.452 **  0.113    1.028    1.648 ***  1.277 *** 0.776 *  0.168    1.596 **  2.603  ** 
_NONOECD  (0.442)     (0.194)    (0.262)    (0.642)    (0.459)    (0.400)    (0.405)    (0.375)    (0.779)    (0.962)    
Time dummies  yes    yes yes yes   yes    yes yes yes yes yes    
Const  -59.725  ***  -34.506 *** -1.221    -10.949 *  -8.403    -31.473 **  -14.283    3.158   -5.554   -28.377    
   (22.269)     (8.089)    (5.871)    (5.911)    (14.175)    (15.746)    (9.723)    (6.990)   (4.596)   (18.688)    
Adjusted R²  0.406    0.725   0.599   0.565   0.410    0.543   0.673   0.768   0.656   0.755    
Number of observations  173     1319    135    257    119    173    799    135    197    78    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in the parentheses. 
1 Dummycommonwealth for the UK Table 3 - Emigration and FDI 
   Italy Spain 
Dependent variable:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
                               
l_TGDP  0.019   0.260     -0.315   -0.227    1.391 * 1.468  * 1.711  *** 1.712 ***
   (2.687)    (2.764)     (2.708)   (3.028)    (0.748)  (0.757)      (0.613)    (0.609)   
l_sq_GDPDIFF  0.387     0.277     0.517    0.477    -0.174    -0.207     -0.091     -0.092   
   (1.261)     (1.304)     (1.216)    (1.369)    (0.150)    (0.153)     (0.089)     (0.092)   
l_PCGDPDIFF  0.019   0.010     0.297 *** 0.299 *** 0.327 *** 0.298 ***  0.055   0.056    
   (0.067)   (0.069)     (0.106)   (0.106)     (0.085)   (0.076)     (0.127)   (0.130)    
l_DIST  -0.680  ***  -0.684  ***  -0.660 *  -0.661 *  -0.588   -0.624  *  -1.088  **  -1.088 ** 
   (0.206)     (0.199)     (0.339)    (0.339)    (0.359)    (0.365)     (0.488)     (0.486)   
l_OPENNESS  0.362    0.426     -0.334   -0.313                      
   (0.514)    (0.543)     (0.674)   (0.741)                      
DUMMYEU15  0.378     0.376     1.088   1.089   0.419    0.282     0.377     0.375   
   (0.447)     (0.447)     (0.655)    (0.659)    (0.485)    (0.499)     (0.746)     (0.768)   
DUMMYOECD  4.534 *  5.120 *  2.393   2.582     0.527   0.786     -0.346   -0.337    
   (2.662)   (3.045)     (2.758)   (3.171)     (1.723)   (1.799)     (2.343)   (2.400)    
DUMMYLANG                                    0.725     0.724   
                                     (0.935)     (0.953)   
DUMMYCOLOTIE                  0.838   0.779              
                   (0.716)   (0.689)              
RELIGION  0.012     -0.059     0.142    0.117    0.471    0.524     -0.102     -0.106   
   (0.559)     (0.577)     (0.756)    (0.813)    (0.780)    (0.775)     (0.948)     (0.959)   
GOVERNANCE  1.632   1.639     -0.176   -0.162     4.671 *** 4.325 ***  2.785   2.775    
   (1.484)   (1.515)     (2.137)   (2.164)     (1.564)   (1.493)     (1.794)   (1.939)    
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI  0.075     0.096     -0.383    -0.377    -0.491    -0.405     -1.086  *  -1.083  
   (0.210)     (0.224)     (0.267)    (0.262)    (0.531)    (0.560)     (0.623)     (0.661)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD  -0.209   -0.211     0.095   0.095    0.696   0.731     0.895    0.895    
   (0.328)   (0.331)     (0.423)   (0.424)     (0.630)   (0.616)     (0.766)   (0.771)    
l_SKILLED_IMMI  0.424     0.424     0.512    0.514    0.617    0.465     0.816     0.810   
_NONOECD  (0.264)     (0.264)     (0.371)    (0.373)    (0.607)    (0.672)     (0.815)     (0.888)   
l_EMIGRANTS  0.293 **       0.368 ***     0.749 ***      0.805 ***    
   (0.127)        (0.135)       (0.148)        (0.169)      
l_EMIGRANTS_OECD        0.264  **       0.360 **       0.602  ***        0.803 ***
         (0.128)          (0.159)         (0.153)           (0.204)   
l_EMIGRANTS     0.336 *      0.382 *    0.823 ***       0.809 ***
_NONOECD      (0.192)         (0.194)      (0.203)          (0.253)   
Time dummies  yes    yes    yes    yes    yes    yes    yes    yes   
const  -6.759   -7.670     -1.982   -2.324     -9.170 *  -8.700 *  -2.633   -2.629    
  (6.145)   (6.806)   (6.743) (7.982) (4.753) (4.490)   (4.063)  (4.041)
Adjusted  R²  0.636   0.633   0.797 0.795 0.678 0.679   0.745  0.744  
Number of observations  135     135     135    135    248    248     189     189   
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Table A1 - Immigrant networks and FDI - France 
               
Dependent var.:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Specification:  TSLS OLS OLS  OLS  OLS OLS 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
                        
l_TGDP  3.274  *** 3.827 *** 3.747 **  3.800 *** 3.128    2.337 ** 
    (0.922)   (0.881)  (1.522)     (0.876)  (0.880)    (1.089)   
l_sq_GDPDIFF  -0.245     -0.283   -0.152    -0.305    -0.298     -0.266   
   (0.168)     (0.171)    (0.144)    (0.217)    (0.251)     (0.256)   
l_PCGDPDIFF  -0.013   0.079  0.125     0.258 **  0.227    0.262 ** 
   (0.094)    (0.089)   (0.112)    (0.100)   (0.102)    (0.105)   
l_DIST  0.386     0.200    0.118    -0.232    -0.113     -0.040   
   (0.409)     (0.368)    (0.378)    (0.462)    (0.440)     (0.447)   
l_OPENNESS  0.992  * 0.890 * 0.777     0.438   0.568    0.511    
   (0.535)    (0.521)   (0.542)    (0.485)   (0.469)    (0.478)   
DUMMYEU15  -0.026     0.489    0.571    1.192    1.258     0.964   
   (0.953)     (0.924)    (1.090)    (0.799)    (0.841)     (0.763)   
DUMMYOECD  -1.216   -0.790  -0.638     -0.320  -0.307    -3.881    
   (0.906)    (0.851)   (4.677)    (0.863)   (0.855)    (3.288)   
DUMMYLANG  3.020  ***  2.411 **  2.338 **  1.030    1.012     0.811   
   (1.108)     (1.074)    (1.167)    (1.056)    (0.968)     (1.028)   
DUMMYCOLOTIE  -2.956 **  -1.997   -1.947     -0.868   -0.992   -0.712    
   (1.272)    (1.147)   (1.269)    (1.139)   (1.018)    (1.116)   
RELIGION  0.865     0.892    0.982    -0.023    0.047     0.009   
   (0.872)     (0.790)    (0.809)    (0.786)    (0.773)     (0.763)   
GOVERNANCE_Std  5.101  ** 4.755 ** 4.537 **  3.205 ** 2.943   3.010 ** 
   (2.064)    (2.007)   (2.085)    (1.483)   (1.477)    (1.476)   
l_IMMIGRANTS  1.014  ***              0.464 **             
   (0.301)                 (0.200)               
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI       0.059   0.080         -0.483    -0.615  
        (0.385)   (0.450)         (0.334)    (0.375)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI        0.650                1.233          
         (0.427)                (0.399)          
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD           0.621             1.754 ***
            (0.879)             (0.644)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI              0.646                1.277 ***
_NONOECD              (0.442)                (0.400)   
                              
Time  dummies  yes   yes yes   yes  yes   yes  
                              
const  -54.335  ***  -56.503 ***  -59.725 *** -48.791 ***  -42.026     -31.473 ** 
   (12.107)     (12.948)    (22.269)    (13.008)    (12.898)     (15.746)   
                                      
Adjusted R²  0.379    0.413   0.406    0.511   0.542    0.543   
Number of observations  173     173    173    173    173     173   
Instrumental variables  Migration to EU15 ('90)                      
First-stage F statistic  110.700                          
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Table A2 - Immigrant networks and FDI - Germany 
Dependent var.:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Specification:  TSLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
l_TGDP  2.889    3.142 *** 3.270 *** 3.528 *** 2.822  *** 2.256 *** 
   (0.577)    (0.536)   (0.558)    (0.713)   (0.714)    (0.745)   
l_sq_GDPDIFF  -0.596     -0.585 ***  -0.587 ***  -0.613 ***  -0.530  **  -0.544 ** 
   (0.158)     (0.169)    (0.164)    (0.231)    (0.218)     (0.220)   
l_PCGDPDIFF  -0.020    0.030   0.035     0.197 *** 0.191  *** 0.230 *** 
    (0.050)    (0.046)  (0.046)     (0.057)  (0.057)   (0.061)    
l_DIST  0.356     0.146    0.133    -0.398    -0.314     -0.245   
   (0.219)     (0.148)    (0.153)    (0.247)    (0.243)     (0.238)   
l_OPENNESS  0.697    0.523   0.521     -0.315  -0.152   -0.143    
    (0.393)    (0.367)  (0.367)     (0.403)  (0.423)   (0.410)    
DUMMYEU15  -0.012     0.340    0.384    1.051 *  1.210  **  1.073 * 
   (0.446)     (0.422)    (0.432)    (0.606)    (0.554)     (0.581)   
DUMMYOECD  0.759    1.077 **  1.770     -0.630  -0.609   -4.457  
    (0.559)    (0.452)  (1.934)     (0.808)  (0.849)   (2.676)    
RELIGION  0.804     0.342    0.359    -0.427    -0.666     -0.618   
   (0.450)     (0.378)    (0.383)    (0.712)    (0.641)     (0.617)   
GOVERNANCE_Std  3.311    2.877 *** 2.868 *** 4.619 *** 4.152  **  3.787 ** 
    (0.859)    (0.800)  (0.802)     (1.698)  (1.783)   (1.658)    
l_IMMIGRANTS  0.609               0.175              
   (0.181)               (0.166)              
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI      0.000   0.002        -0.473   -0.484 * 
        (0.162)  (0.162)        (0.308)   (0.276)    
l_SKILLED_IMMI        0.441 **            0.902  **      
         (0.191)              (0.368)         
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD       0.368            1.243 *** 
         (0.265)            (0.354)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI             0.452 **             0.776 * 
_NONOECD                                 
Time  dummies  yes   yes yes   yes  yes   yes  
const  -33.250     -32.682 ***  -34.506 ***  -29.202 ***  -23.521  ***  -14.283   
   (7.210)     (7.595)    (8.089)    (8.752)    (8.499)     (9.723)   
Adjusted  R²  0.698    0.725  0.725     0.638  0.664   0.673    
Number of observations  1314     1319    1319    799    799     799   
Instrumental variables  Migration to EU15 ('90)         First-stage F statistic  43.180   













Table A3 - Immigrant networks and FDI - Italy 
Dependent var.:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Specification:  TSLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
l_TGDP -4.886    -1.645 -1.120   0.602   -1.707    -1.393  
   (5.076)    (2.408)   (2.548)   (2.772)   (2.935)    (3.045)   
l_sq_GDPDIFF  2.642     1.154    0.982   0.196    1.219     1.115   
   (2.349)     (1.141)    (1.175)   (1.272)    (1.354)     (1.383)   
l_PCGDPDIFF -0.024    -0.081   -0.052     0.284 ***  0.379  ***  0.360 *** 
   (0.081)    (0.069)   (0.060)    (0.099)   (0.120)    (0.119)   
l_DIST  0.170     -0.656 ***  -0.783 ***  -0.577 **  -0.717  **  -0.791 *** 
   (0.605)     (0.195)    (0.221)    (0.287)    (0.289)     (0.328)   
l_OPENNESS  1.140    -0.116   -0.120    -0.265   -0.952    -0.941   
   (0.822)    (0.524)   (0.520)    (0.586)   (0.640)    (0.650)   
DUMMYEU15  0.551     0.372    0.342    1.264 *  1.092     1.066   
   (0.535)     (0.464)    (0.446)    (0.650)    (0.687)     (0.663)   
DUMMYOECD  0.222    -0.063   3.069    -1.476 **  -0.942    0.801   
   (0.801)    (0.467)   (2.695)    (0.647)   (0.717)    (2.963)   
RELIGION  0.403     0.749    0.886 *  0.912    1.119  *  1.190 * 
   (0.691)     (0.500)    (0.453)    (0.613)    (0.616)     (0.598)   
GOVERNANCE  3.738  **  1.278   1.792    1.823   0.254    0.557   
   (1.839)    (1.470)   (1.300)    (2.028)   (2.176)    (2.240)   
l_IMMIGRANTS  1.063              -0.070              
   (0.637)               (0.155)              
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI       0.360 **  0.265        -0.111    -0.164   
        (0.164)   (0.181)        (0.243)    (0.247)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI        -0.157              0.015         
         (0.261)              (0.344)         
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD         -0.365            -0.098   
          (0.361)            (0.419)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI             0.113               0.168   
_NONOECD             (0.262)               (0.375)   
Time dummies  yes    yes   yes    yes   yes    yes   
const  -16.309     1.545    -1.221    -3.159    4.642     3.158   
   (10.439)     (5.275)    (5.871)    (5.483)    (6.267)     (6.990)   
Adjusted R²  0.341    0.590   0.599    0.750   0.769    0.768   
Number of observations  150     135    135   150    135     135  
Instrumental variables  Migration to EU15 ('90)         First-stage F statistic  3.680   
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Table A4 - Immigrant networks and FDI - Spain 
             
Dependent var.:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Specification:  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
                                  
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
                        
l_TGDP  3.603  *** 3.000 *** 2.776 *** 3.980 *** 3.130  *** 3.107 *** 
    (0.815)   (0.818)  (0.847)     (0.628)  (0.733)    (0.800)   
l_sq_GDPDIFF  -0.461  *  -0.415 *  -0.413 *  -0.393 **  -0.337  **  -0.338 ** 
   (0.235)     (0.219)    (0.212)    (0.177)    (0.167)     (0.166)   
l_PCGDPDIFF  0.215  * 0.239 * 0.243 **  0.107   0.047    0.048    
   (0.116)    (0.122)   (0.121)    (0.120)   (0.150)    (0.150)   
l_DIST  -0.897  **  -0.850 *  -0.771 *  -1.270 **  -1.381  ***  -1.368 ** 
   (0.448)     (0.453)    (0.448)    (0.497)    (0.517)     (0.528)   
DUMMYEU15  1.251   1.162  0.963     0.900  0.364   0.351    
   (0.785)    (0.791)   (0.714)    (0.823)   (0.939)    (1.016)   
DUMMYOECD  0.643     0.402    -1.394    -0.089    -0.310     -0.539   
   (0.731)     (0.769)    (2.373)    (0.962)    (1.049)     (2.924)   
DUMMYLANG            3.271 ***  2.644  **  2.638 ** 
                 (1.192)   (1.245)    (1.270)   
DUMMYCOLOTIE  3.974  ***  3.504 ***  3.439 ***                  
   (0.828)     (0.843)    (0.842)                    
RELIGION  1.016   0.705  0.629     0.901  0.859   0.846    
   (0.852)    (0.890)   (0.904)    (1.334)   (1.278)    (1.260)   
GOVERNANCE_Std  5.392  ***  5.883 ***  6.161 ***  3.216 **  4.644  **  4.655 ** 
  (1.737)     (1.795)    (1.823)    (1.582)    (1.805)     (1.842)   
l_IMMIGRANTS  0.112            -0.215          
   (0.181)         (0.198)         
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI        -0.690    -0.685          -1.398  **  -1.391 ** 
         (0.551)    (0.553)          (0.605)     (0.615)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI       1.057             1.610  **      
        (0.642)             (0.763)        
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD              1.282 *              1.628 ** 
               (0.692)                (0.801)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI           1.028             1.596 ** 
_NONOECD           (0.642)             (0.779)   
                              
Time dummies  yes     yes    yes    yes    yes     yes   
                                      
const  -14.312  ** -11.920 ** -10.949 *  -9.711 **  -5.658    -5.554    
   (5.585)     (5.813)    (5.911)    (4.637)    (4.363)     (4.596)   
                                      
Adjusted R²  0.552    0.564   0.565    0.626   0.658    0.656   
Number of observations  261     257    257    201    197     197   
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Table A5 - Immigrant networks and FDI - United Kingdom 
                
Dependent var.:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Specification:  OLS OLS OLS  TSLS  OLS OLS 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
                         
l_TGDP  0.557   0.339  0.303     1.996 ***  1.772  ***  2.172 *** 
    (0.804)   (0.774)  (0.947)     (0.701)  (0.588)   (0.597)    
l_sq_GDPDIFF  -0.091     -0.080    -0.077    -0.365 ***  -0.232  ***  -0.253 *** 
   (0.155)     (0.094)    (0.089)    (0.101)    (0.070)     (0.063)   
l_PCGDPDIFF -0.192  ***  -0.147 **  -0.149 **  0.091 *  0.130  **  0.102 * 
    (0.069)   (0.067)  (0.068)     (0.051)  (0.051)   (0.054)    
l_DIST  0.706  **  0.517 *  0.516 *  -1.256 ***  -0.837  **  -1.034 *** 
   (0.324)     (0.291)    (0.292)    (0.390)    (0.378)     (0.332)   
l_OPENNESS  0.108   0.308  0.312     -2.170 ***  -1.069  *  -1.058 * 
    (0.597)   (0.542)  (0.523)     (0.559)  (0.626)   (0.572)    
DUMMYEU15  0.847     0.598    0.604    0.534    0.278     0.175   
   (0.808)     (0.826)    (0.828)    (0.502)    (0.532)     (0.494)   
DUMMYOECD  0.470   -0.250  -0.718     -1.573  -1.248    16.250  
    (1.206)   (1.291)  (4.742)     (1.066)  (0.917)   (9.866)    
DUMMYLANG                    3.140 ***  1.199     1.338 * 
                     (0.834)    (0.959)     (0.788)   
DUMMYCOMMONWEALTH -0.958    -1.575 *  -1.552 *  0.302   0.576    0.837    
    (0.830)   (0.918)  (0.838)     (0.619)  (0.583)   (0.512)    
RELIGION  0.284     0.687    0.675    -2.149 **  -0.906     -1.317   
   (0.815)     (0.722)    (0.744)    (1.047)    (0.957)     (0.939)   
GOVERNANCE_Std  0.770   1.688  1.617     8.052 ***  6.886  ***  7.411 *** 
    (1.777)   (1.822)  (1.571)     (1.740)  (1.793)   (1.957)    
l_IMMIGRANTS  0.650  ***              -0.417               
   (0.227)                 (0.297)               
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI     -0.765 *  -0.769 *       -0.717  **  -0.630  
       (0.388)   (0.398)         (0.350)    (0.381)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI        1.670 ***              1.051  *       
         (0.525)                (0.610)          
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD         1.703 **           0.780    
           (0.721)             (0.549)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI              1.648 ***              2.603 ** 
_NONOECD              (0.459)                (0.962)   
Time  dummies  yes   yes yes   yes  yes   yes  
                
Const  -11.059     -9.105    -8.403    6.047    -8.781     -28.377   
   (11.283)     (10.546)    (14.175)    (11.622)    (11.396)     (18.688)   
Adjusted  R²  0.369   0.415  0.410     0.696  0.724   0.755    
Number of observations  119     119    119    78    78     78   
Instrumental variables  Migration to EU15 ('90)     First-stage F statistic  21.920   
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Appendix - List of partner countries 
France (years: 1990, 1999)        Italy (years: 2002-2005) 
Albania Cyprus  Laos  *  Romania  Albania  Egypt  Luxembourg  Slovenia 
Algeria *  Czech  R.   Latvia  Russian  Fed.   Algeria  France  Malaysia  South Africa 
Angola  Denmark  Lebanon *  Saudi Arabia  Argentina  Germany  Mexico  Spain 
Argentina  Djibouti + *  Libyan Ar. Jam.  Senegal + *  Australia  Greece  Morocco  Sweden 
Australia Egypt  Lithuania  Singapore  Austria  Hungary  Netherlands  Switzerland 
Austria Finland  Luxembourg  Slovak  Republic Brazil  India  Norway  Thailand 
Belarus  Gabon + *  Madagascar + *  Slovenia Bulgaria  Indonesia  Philippines  Tunisia 
Belgium Germany  Malaysia  South  Africa  Canada  Iran  Poland Turkey 
Benin + *  Greece  Mali + *  Spain  Chile  Ireland  Portugal  Ukraine 
Bolivia  Guinea + *  Mauritania *  Sri Lanka  China   Israel  Romania  UK 
Brazil  Haiti + *  Mauritius *  Sweden  Croatia  Japan  Russian  Fed.   United States 
Bulgaria Hong  Kong  Mexico  Switzerland  Czech  R.   Korea. S.  Singapore  Venezuela 
Burkina Faso + *  Hungary  Morocco *  Syrian Arab R. *  Denmark  Libya  Slovak Republic 
Cambodia *  Iceland  Netherlands  Taiwan  Spain (2003-2006) 
Cameroon + *  India *  New Zealand  Thailand  Algeria  France  Mexico +*  Slovakia 
Canada  Indonesia  Niger + *  Togo + *  Argentina +*  Germania  Moldova  Slovenia 
Central Afr. R. + *  Iran   Nigeria  Tunisia *  Australia  Greece  Monaco  South Africa 
Chad + *  Ireland  Norway  Turkey  Austria  Hungary  Morocco*  Sri Lanka 
Chile Israel  Pakistan  Ukraine  Belgium Iceland  Mozambique  Sudan 
China  *  Italy  Panama  United Kingdom  Bolivia +*  India  Netherlands  Sweden 
Colombia  Ivory C. +*  Paraguay  United States Brazil  Indonesia  New  Zealand Switzerland 
Comoros *  Japan  Peru  Uruguay  Bulgaria   Iran  Nicaragua +*  Syria 
Congo. Rep. + *  Kazakhstan  Philippines  Venezuela Canada Ireland  Norway  Taiwan 
Congo. Dem.R. *  Kenya  Poland  Vietnam *  Chile +*  Israel  Pakistan  Tanzania 
Costa Rica  Korea. S.  Portugal     China Italy  Panama  +*  Thailand 
Croatia  Kuwait  Qatar     Colombia +*  Jamaica*  Paraguay +*  Tunisia 
Germany (years: 1991-2006)  Costa Rica+*  Japan  Peru +*  Turkey 
          Croatia  Kenya  Philippines*  UK 
Algeria  Egypt  Liberia  Saudi Arabia  Cuba +*  Korea  Poland  Ukraine 
Argentina  El Salvador  Libyan A. Jam.  Serbia and Mont. Cyprus  Latvia  Portugal  United Ar. E. 
Australia Estonia  Liechtenstein  Singapore  Czech  R.   Lebanon  Romania  United States 
Austria Finland  Lithuania  Slovak  Republic  Denmark  Libyan Arab Jam.  Russia  Uruguay +* 
Bangladesh France Luxembourg  Slovenia  Dominic.R+*  Lithuania  Saudi Arabia  Venezuela +* 
Belarus Ghana  Macedonia  South  Africa  Ecuador +*  Luxembourg  Senegal  Vietnam 
Belgium  Greece  Malaysia  Spain  Egypt  Malaysia  Serbia and Mont. 
Bolivia  Guatemala  Malta  Sri Lanka  Finland  Malta  Singapore    
Bosnia-Herzeg. Honduras  Mexico  Sweden  United Kingdom (years: 1990, 1995, 2001) 
Brazil  Hungary  Morocco  Switzerland           
Bulgaria Iceland  Netherlands  Syrian Arab Rep. Australia + °  Finland  Latvia  Russian Fed. 
Cameroon India New  Zealand  Taiwan  Austria  France  Lithuania  Singapore  +° 
Canada Indonesia  Nicaragua  Tanzania  Belgium  Germany   Luxembourg  Slovak  R.  
Chile  Iran   Nigeria  Thailand  Bermuda +  Ghana + °  Malaysia °  Slovenia 
China   Ireland  Norway  Tunisia  Brazil  Greece  Malta + °  South Afr. +° 
Colombia  Israel  Pakistan  Turkey  Canada + °  Hong Kong +  Mauritius + °  Spain 
Costa Rica  Italy  Panama  Ukraine  Chile Hungary  Mexico  Sweden 
Côte d'Ivoire  Jamaica  Paraguay  United Kingdom  China   India + °  Netherlands  Switzerland 
Croatia Japan  Peru United  States  Colombia  Indonesia New  Zealand  +°  Thailand 
Cyprus Kazakhstan  Philippines  Uruguay  Cyprus °  Ireland +  Nigeria + °  Tunisia 
Czech Republic  Kenya  Poland  Uzbekistan  Czech  R.   Italy  Norway  US + 
Denmark  Korea.  S.   Portugal  Venezuela  Denmark  Japan  Panama  Zimbabwe + 
Dominican  R.   Latvia  Romania  Vietnam  Egypt  Kenya + °  Poland    
Ecuador  Lebanon  Russian Fed.    Estonia  Korea (South)  Portugal   
 + Dummylanguage. * Dummycolonialtie. ° Dummycommonwealth 
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